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The relative property of the Son is to be begotten, that is, so to proceed from the Father as to be a participant of the same essence and perfectly carry on the Father's nature.
Sanctification is the real change in man from the sordidness of sin to the purity of God's image.
In contentment and joy are found the height and perfection of all love towards our neighbor.
From faith, hope, and love, the virtues of religion referring to God, there arises a double act which bears on the spiritual communion exercised between God and us; the hearing of the word and prayer.
Hence the end of the world should be awaited with all longing by all believers.
Everyone who understands the nature of God rightly necessarily knows that God is to be believed and hoped in, that he is to be loved and called upon, and to be heard in all things.
Faith is the virtue by which, clinging-to the faithfulness of God, we lean upon him, so that we may obtain what he gives to us.
Ideology has very little to do with 'consciousness' - it is profoundly unconscious.
Ideology... is indispensable in any society if men are to be formed, transformed and equipped to respond to the demands of their conditions of existence.
When we come to images or memories or thoughts, speculation, while always closely related to practice, is more explicit, and it is in fact not immediately obvious that such processes can be described in any sense as practical.
We cannot therefore say that mental acts contain a cognitive as well as a conative element.
Thus the same object may supply a practical perception to one person and a speculative one to another, or the same person may perceive it partly practically and partly speculatively.
The thing of which the act of perception is the perception is experienced as something not mental.
The sensory acts are accordingly distinguished by their objects.
The perceptive act is a reaction of the mind upon the object of which it is the perception.
The mental act of sensation which issues in reflex movement is so simple as to defy analysis.
Such being the nature of mental life, the business of psychology is primarily to describe in detail the various forms which attention or conation assumes upon the different levels of that life.
Psychology is the science of the act of experiencing, and deals with the whole system of such acts as they make up mental life.
Mental life is indeed practical through and through. It begins in practice and it ends in practice.
It is more difficult to designate this form of conation on its practical side by a satisfactory name.
It is convenient to distinguish the two kinds of experience which have thus been described, the experienc-ing and the experienc-ed, by technical words.
In the perception of a tree we can distinguish the act of experiencing, or perceiving, from the thing experienced, or perceived.
Hence, in desiring, the more the enjoyment is delayed, the more fancy begins to weave about the object images of future fruition, and to clothe the desired object with properties calculated to inflame the impulse.
Desire then is the invasion of the whole self by the wish, which, as it invades, sets going more and more of the psychical processes; but at the same time, so long as it remains desire, does not succeed in getting possession of the self.
Curiosity begins as an act of tearing to pieces or analysis.
But unfortunately Locke treated ideas of reflection as if they were another class of objects of contemplation beside ideas of sensation.
But though cognition is not an element of mental action, nor even in any real sense of the word an aspect of it, the distinction of cognition and conation has if properly defined a definite value.
An object is not first imagined or thought about and then expected or willed, but in being actively expected it is imagined as future and in being willed it is thought.
The interval between a cold expectation and a warm desire may be filled by expectations of varying degrees of warmth or by desires of varying degrees of coldness.
For psychological purposes the most important differences in conation are those in virtue of which the object is revealed as sensed or perceived or imaged or remembered or thought.